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A random utility discrete choice experiments is used to determine farmers' preferences 
for health insurance, crop insurance, and a product that switches some portion of crop 
insurance subsidy to health insurance premium subsidy with access to large-pool risk 
groups.  
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U.S. farmers are offered a variety of subsidized crop insurance options, but as 
self-employed entrepreneurs, they are at a disadvantage when purchasing health 
insurance.  This is due to the fact the farmers cannot form common employer groups and, 
as individuals, any insurance risk pool that they would elect to join would be subject to 
adverse selection.  This situation is compounded by the rising cost of healthcare and the 
fact that farming is considered a high-risk occupation, leading to increased health 
insurance premiums. Often, traditional farm families seek off-farm employment that 
provides health insurance as a benefit.  This option may contribute to rural-urban 
migration trends and may not be available to rural communities that have significant 
distance from urban areas.   
  Theory suggests that farmers strive to balance all farm business and financial risks 
in the context of a portfolio (Escalante and Barry, 2001).  A logical extension of this 
model assumes that farmers also strive to balance both business and personal health risks.  
This extension implies that farmers may have different preferences for federal subsidies 
that are available from federal risk mitigation programs.  Individual farmers may be over-
insured in terms of federal crop insurance for yield or revenue risk, but underinsured in 
terms of health risk.  Many federal programs are available to farmers to mitigate crop 
enterprise or business risk, but farmers have limited assistance to mitigate health risk.  By 
allowing farmers to reallocate federal insurance subsidy, they may be able to increase 
overall risk protection while fostering program efficiency gains derived from better 
allocation of federal funds.   
  2A random utility discrete choice experiment is used to determine farmer’s 
preferences for health insurance, crop insurance, and a holistic product that combines 
crop and health insurance.  The holistic product allows farmers to switch some portion of 
crop insurance subsidy to health insurance subsidy and facilitate access to large-pool risk 
groups.  Choice experiments have been used extensively in the literature for the valuation 
of non-market goods and services (Alpizar et al, 2001, Hall et al, 2002, Viney et al, 
2002).  Choice experiments allow researchers to value goods by using individuals stated 
preferences in a hypothetical setting.  Choices with alternative attributes and levels of 
desired attributes were used in this study to elicit farmers’ preference for alternative 
household risk mitigation strategies.   
Through the use of focus groups from the health insurance industry, the crop 
insurance industry, extension experts, and farmers, attributes and levels of the desirable 
and workable products were selected.  Types of crop insurance coverage analyzed 
include: multiple peril crop insurance, crop revenue coverage, revenue assurance, and 
adjusted gross revenue insurance.  Crop insurance attributes include coverage level and 
premium.  Attributes for the analysis of health insurance benefits include: coverage type; 
coinsurance; deductible; drug benefit; office visit co-pay, and premium.  The premium in 
the health insurance section is adjusted to reflect what a typical employer-sponsored 
health plan would pay.  Attributes included for the analysis of a holistic product include; 
crop coverage type, coverage level, provider group, subsidy switch and premium
2. 
                                                 
2 Attributes and levels for all insurance products (crop, health, and holistic) have been determined through 
the use of expert groups.  Experts have illustrated ranges that would be proper for the type of experiment 
being conducted. 
 
  3If all combinations of attributes and levels were presented to respondents, this 
design (full factorial) would have consisted of 14,348,907 different possible product 
combinations.  Using the D-optimality procedure discussed later, these choices were 
reduced to four blocks of nine choices and problems with orthogonality of selected 
choices were eliminated without sacrificing much information other than higher order 
interactions.  Surveys were collected in over 21 counties throughout North Dakota and 
Minnesota, representing different risk areas and different crop and livestock regions. 
Most respondents were part of the North Dakota and Minnesota Farm and Ranch 
Business Management Education Program
3.  Farmers’ preference for crop insurance, 
health insurance, and a holistic product was analyzed using multinomial logit models.  
Details of the multinomial logit model are presented in the method section. 
This study provides several important contributions to the existing literature on 
crop insurance and household risk management strategies.  First, it provides baseline data 
on farmers stated preference for alternative risk mitigation strategies. This is an important 
first step to understand how to better formulate policies that may efficiently reallocate 
federal subsidy to farmers.  Second, farmer’s preference and willingness to pay for whole 
farm insurance products are derived.  The hypothesis that whole farm insurance products, 
like adjust gross revenue (AGR), may lead to lower risks and lower premiums and 
therefore should be preferred by farmers is yet to be tested empirically.  Third, some 
studies have made significant contributions regarding farmers’ preferences for crop 
insurance attributes, but these studies have been limited by their use of conjoint analysis 
                                                 
3 The North Dakota and Minnesota Farm Business Management Education Programs are randomly selected 
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financial characteristics (North Dakota and Minnesota Farm and Ranch Business Management Education 
Reports, Multiple year). 
  4and potential demand implications for new products (Sherrick et al, 2003, Sherrick et al, 
2004).  Using choice experiments it is possible to extend the analysis of farmers stated 
preferences and derive demand functions for alternative hypothetical insurance products 
and farmers willingness to pay for these products.  This is particularly important in a 
holistic product setting.        
Literature Review 
  Studies on crop risk have identified health risk as an important risk attribute.  
Patrick et al (1985) surveyed farmers to better understand what they perceived to be the 
most challenging or important risks they faced in crop production and ways to manage 
these risks.  Results indicate that producers consider more than just yield and price risk 
when making crop enterprise decisions, but these two remain the most important.  Other 
sources of crop enterprise risk important to the survey group were inflation, input cost, 
disease and pests, world events, safety and health.  However, empirical and theoretical 
models have evaluated crop and health risk separately. 
Current health risk mitigation strategies have proven to be inadequate in 
managing household risks.  Leno (2003) states that there are four main strategies being 
used by farmers to mitigate health risks.  These strategies are: to pay for health insurance 
with out-of-pocket expenses, use a publicly subsidized plan, get insurance through group 
or coop insurance, or have one party in the household secure employment for off-farm 
employment insurance.  These strategies may lead to rural-urban migration.  Gripp and 
Ford (1992) analyzed the determinants of holding health insurance coverage for 
Pennsylvania dairy farm managers.  Major results of this study were that older farmers, 
higher education levels, and greater farm income all increase the probability of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
  5respondent holding health insurance.  Meyer, Orazem and Wachenheim (2002) analyze 
labor supply responses to employer-provided health insurance.  They concluded that 
employees enjoy significant benefits with employer based insurance and their large risk 
pool nature. Bharadwaj and Findeis (2003) examine the motivations for off-farm work 
among farm women in the United States.  The researchers found that farm families with 
substantial farm assets are less likely to work off-farm.  While these people are less likely 
to work off the farm, the paper finds that labor markets offering jobs with benefits are 
attracting labor off American farms, large and small.  Health benefits are one of the main 
reasons for farmers and their spouses to seek off-farm employment.   
Methods to evaluate farmers’ preferences for alternative risk mitigation strategies 
have been limited to conjoint analysis.  Sherrick et al (2003) determine farmers’ 
preferences for crop insurance attributes using conjoint analysis.  The authors found the 
most important crop insurance attributes to be coverage level and acreage flexibility.  
Conjoint analysis limits the ability to explore the demand and willingness to pay for the 
entire range (existing and potential) products.  Using choice experiments, it will be 
possible to extend stated preference analysis to understand farmers preference for 
alternative risk mitigation strategies (Alpizar, Carlsson, and Martinsson, 2001).  Viney, 
Lancsar, and Louviere (2002) utilize discrete choice experiments as a method to elicit and 
analyze individuals’ preferences for health and healthcare.  The paper provides an 
overview of the approach that is used and discusses issues that arise when using discrete 
choice experiments to assess individual preferences for healthcare.  The empirical model 
used in this study extends Viney, Lancsar, and Louviere model to incorporate a holistic 
product of crop and health risks.  
  6Methodology 
The choice experiment methodology has three main components.  First, focus 
groups must be conducted to assure correct attributes and levels are presented to the 
survey respondents.  Second, experimental design must be performed to narrow the 
possible choices from the full factorial design to a design that a respondent can complete 
in a reasonable amount of time.  Third, an appropriate econometric model must be 
determined from the distribution of the error term of the respondent’s utility function.  
The proceeding section discusses this three components in detail.   
It is important to present the correct attributes and levels to the farmers that are 
being surveyed.  In order to ensure the correct attributes and levels for crop, health and 
the holistic products are being evaluated, expert focus group interviews from the crop 
insurance industry and the health insurance industry were conducted.  These groups 
identified attributes, and attribute levels that such products must have in order to be 
fundamentally sound, economically feasible, and generally accepted.  The health 
insurance experts group was completed on June 10, 2003.  This group was asked mostly 
open-ended questions.  A major finding from this group was that adverse selection is a 
big problem when forming health insurance groups.  These groups need to be either low 
cost or mandatory to avoid these problems.  The crop insurance experts group was 
completed on July 11, 2003.  This group emphasized that a proposed holistic insurance 
program must be simple to administer.  Following these groups, a preliminary focus 
group and survey of farmers was conducted to ensure all survey items were logical and 
consistent with the targeted survey population.  A preliminary farmers’ group was 
completed on September 11, 2003.  A second farmers’ group was completed on 
  7September 23, 2003, following comments and revisions from the preliminary farmer 
group.   
Stated preference methods (which include choice experiments) assess the value of 
non-market goods by using an individual’s stated behavior in a hypothetical setting.  
Stated preference methods were used in this study because the researcher is able to 
control relationships between attributes, which permits mapping of utility functions with 
technologies different from existing ones, as well as being able to include existing and/or 
proposed choice alternatives. 
Choice experiments are being applied more and more frequently for the valuation 
of non-market goods.  Choice experiments give the value of a certain good by separately 
evaluating the preferences of individuals for the relevant attributes that characterize the 
good, and by doing this it provides much information that can be applied to the preferred 
design of the good.   
Individuals participating in a choice experiment are given a hypothetical setting 
and asked to choose their preferred alternative among several alternatives in a choice set.  
The individuals are usually asked to perform a sequence of these choice sets.  Each 
alternative choice available in the survey is described by a number of attributes or 
characteristics.  A monetary value is included as one of the attributes, along with other 
attributes of importance to the alternative presented.  When an individual makes a choice, 
they implicitly make tradeoffs between levels of the attributes in the different alternatives 
in a choice set (Alpizar, Carlsson, Martinsson, 2001).  Experimental design, in this case, 
is the creation of choice sets in an efficient manner.  The standard approach in marketing, 
transportation, and health economics has been to use orthogonal designs, where the 
  8variations of the attributes of the alternatives are uncorrelated in all choice sets.  A design 
is developed in two steps: first, obtaining the optimal combinations of attributes and 
attribute levels to be included in the experiment and, second, combining those profiles 
into choice sets. 
A starting point is the full factorial design, which is a design that contains all 
possible combinations of the attribute levels that characterize the different alternatives.  A 
full-factorial design is generally very large and not tractable in a choice experiment.  
Therefore, it is necessary to choose a subset of all possible combinations, while following 
some criteria for optimality, and then construct the choice sets.  In choice experiments, 
design techniques used for linear models have been popular.  Orthogonality, in particular, 
has often been used as the principle part of an efficient design (Huber and Zwerina, 
1996).  Marketing researchers have developed design techniques based on the D-optimal 
criteria for non-linear models in a choice experiment context.  D-optimality is related to 
the covariance matrix of the K-parameters, defined as    . ] | [|
1 / 1 − Ω = −
K efficiency D
Huber and Zwerina (1996) identify four principals for an efficient design of a choice 
experiment based on a non-linear model: (i) orthogonality, (ii) level balance, (iii) minimal 
overlap, and (iv) utility balance.  Table 1 presents examples of the three choice set 
designs that were evaluated in this paper.  
The economic model presented in this section deals only with purely discrete 
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where, U[…] is a quasi-concave utility function; ci(Ai) is alternative combination i 
(profile i) as a function of its generic and alternative specific attributes, the vector Ai;  pi 
is the price of each profile; z is a composite bundle of ordinary goods with its price 
normalized to 1 and y is income.   
A number of properties follow from the specification of the maximization 
problem: First, the ci’s are profiles defined for all the relevant alternatives.  For example, 
one such profile could be a health insurance plan with only health benefits, coinsurance 
of 80/20, a yearly deductible of $1,000 and a monthly premium of $700.  Additionally, 
the choice of any profile is for a fixed, and given, amount of it, e.g. a day or a unit.  There 
are N such profiles, where N is given by all relevant profiles.  In the current investigation, 
there are 15 factors, or attributes to be considered.  Each of these attributes has three 
levels, so the full factorial design will imply 3
15 or N=14,348,907.  Second, the price 
variable in the budget restriction must be related to the complete profile of the alternative, 
including the given continuous dimension.  For example, premium paid at each coverage 
level. 
  Third, the numbers of alternatives that can be chosen are defined by restriction ii.  
Generally, choice experiment researchers are focused on obtaining a single choice.  
Fourth, in a purely discrete choice, the selection of a particular profile cj(Aj), which is 
provided in an exogenously fixed quantity, implies that, for a given income, the amount 
  10of ordinary goods z that can be purchased is also fixed.  Combining this with the 
restriction that only a single profile, cj, can be chosen results in the equation: 
           ( 2 )   j jc p y z − =
 Fifth,  restriction  iii specifies that the individual will choose a non-negative 
quantity of the composite good and the goods being studied.  If it is assumed that the 
good is essential to the individual or that an environmental program must be 
implemented, then the respondent made a choice (ci > 0 for at least one i). 
  The multinomial logit (MNL) model assumes that the random components are 
independently and identically distributed with an extreme value type I distribution 
(Gumbel).  This distribution is characterized by a scale parameter δ
4.  The scale 
parameter is related to the variance of the distribution such that
2 2 6   var µ π ε = .  When it 
is assumed that the random components are extreme value distributed, the choice 
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  There are two basic problems with the MNL specification: first, the alternatives 
are independent, and second, there is a limitation in modeling variation in taste among 
respondents.  The IID assumption (constant variance) causes the first problem, which 
results in the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property.  This property states 
that the ratio of choice probabilities between two alternatives in a choice set is unaffected 
by changes in that choice set.  The MNL model should not be used if this assumption is 
violated. 
  11There are several hypotheses that are included with this project.  The first is that 
farmers prefer a whole farm crop insurance product and are willing to pay for this 
product.  The second hypothesis is that healthcare spending significantly affects farmers’ 
preferences for health insurance, or higher premiums will prevent farmers from obtaining 
health insurance coverage.  The third hypothesis is that farmers prefer a holistic product 
to mitigate crop and health risk jointly and are willing to pay for this product.  The fourth 
hypothesis of this project is that farmers are willing to switch a portion of their federal 
crop insurance subsidy to compliment health coverage.  
Results 
A total of 86 surveys were returned with complete and usable discrete choice 
survey portions
5.  Farmers included in focus groups for this study believe they face 
obstacles in obtaining affordable health insurance because they lack access to groups like 
other employer-sponsored healthcare plans.  Another finding of focus groups was that 
farmers may be willing to switch some of their federal crop insurance premium subsidy 
to health insurance if this switch would allow them access to large risk groups for 
insurance pooling purposes.  Table 2 contains descriptive information about the 
respondents.  
From the results of the generalized discrete multinomial logit model it is possible 
to determine how each attribute and attribute level affects the probability of the 
respondent’s overall choice of insurance product.  The attributes affecting the probability 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
5 Only 60 respondents were required to satisfy the optimal design and provide a required sample size of 
2160 observations (36 * 60).  Another advantage of choice experiments is that smaller samples can be used 
to respond to several choice sets.  86 survey in this study provided a larger sample size (information set) 
than required, with desirable properties of large samples.    
 
  12of the respondent’s choice of crop insurance product are the crop insurance type, 
coverage level, and premium.  Each of these attributes has three levels to select from.  
The crop insurance section of the survey was arranged into three blocks of six.  This 
design was discussed previously in the experimental design section.   
Hausman and McFadden (1984) proposed a specification test for the multinomial 
logit model to test the assumption of the independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA).  
Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives is a consequence of the initial assumption that 
stochastic terms in the utility function are independently and identically distributed.  The 
procedure is to first estimate the model with all choices.  The alternative specification is 
the model with a smaller set of choices.  Thus, the model is estimated with this restricted 
set of alternatives and the same model specification.  The set of alternatives is reduced to 
those in which one of the smaller set of choices is made.  The test statistic is  
] [ ] [ ]' [
1
u r u r u r b b V V b b q − − − =
−  
where ‘r’ and ‘u’ indicate restricted and unrestricted (larger choice set) models and V is 
an estimated covariance matrix for the estimates.  In order to compute the coefficients in 
the restricted model, it is necessary to drop those observations that choose the omitted 
choice.  In this case, 139 observations were skipped.  The Hausman statistic is used to 
carry out the test.  In this case the Pr(C>c) value of 0.000000 suggests that the 
independence from irrelevant alternatives assumption is satisfied. 
Table 3 presents the results of the multinomial logit model for the crop insurance 
stated preferences: 
ε α β α α α
α α α α
+ + + + +
+ + + + =
LVar C emium vel CoverageLe acres Size Education
re EmployInsu NetWorth Age ears OperationY Y
LVar C em CL Size EDU
NFPEI NW Age Opyear
/ Pr ) ( / Pr
 
  13In this model, different choices of crop insurance product are influenced by 
different factors.  The only variables that are significant across all three choices are 
education and crop insurance type, which is perfectly correlated with the choice.  
Education has a positive coefficient, meaning that as this variable increases in level, so 
will the probability of the respondent choosing that particular insurance product.  There 
are many other significant variables in the model, but these variables are not significant 
across all choices.  This demonstrates the respondents differing motives, business, and 
personal needs when choosing crop insurance products to mitigate business and financial 
risk.   
When choosing MPCI, the significant variables are: net worth, paid employee 
insurance, education, farm size, crop insurance type, and crop insurance coverage level.  
MPCI has the most significant variables in the model, but does not include crop insurance 
premium as a significant variable.  This could be attributed to a number of factors.  
Coverage level could be much more important when making decisions regarding MPCI 
or farmers could have regarded the premium section as unbelievable in the survey 
because most of the respondents already hold MPCI and know what the premium is, 
negating the levels presented.   
The significant variables for Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) are: net worth, 
employee insurance, education, farm size, crop and livestock variable, crop insurance 
type, and crop insurance premium.  The significant variables when choosing CRC 
illustrated that as wealth, education, and farm size increase, there is an increased 
probability of holding yield and revenue products like CRC as opposed to yield only 
products like MPCI.  The crop and livestock variable being negative and significant show 
  14that as a producer moves from crop production to mixed crop/livestock to livestock only 
production there is decreased probability of holding crop insurance.  This finding makes 
sense as this crop insurance product is not offered for livestock.  When selecting CRC, 
coverage level was not significant to the model but premium was significant and had a 
negative coefficient, as expected.  This demonstrates that farmers may not care about 
coverage levels as much as price when selecting this type of insurance.  As premiums 
increase, the probability of holding CRC will decrease. 
When choosing adjusted gross revenue or whole farm insurance, the variables that 
are significant to the model are: education, crop and livestock variable, crop insurance 
type, and crop insurance premium.  These significant variables are very similar to the 
significant variables for CRC.  This shows that farmers may make decisions based on the 
same criteria for whole-farm insurance as they do for current yield/revenue products.   
Table 4 presents a model where demographic characteristics have been included 
with health insurance attributes to determine what factors influence health insurance 
choice decisions.  The health insurance section of the survey has been broken into four 
blocks of nine to make it possible for one person to rate all alternatives in a timely 
fashion.  The independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption has been tested 
and is satisfied in the health insurance multinomial logit model.  Table 4 presents the 
results of the discrete multinomial logit model for the health insurance preferences: 
ε β β
β β β α α α α
+ + +
+ + + + + + =
em Type
Copay DRUG DED HCS OHIB NW Age Y
em Type
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There are only two variables that are not significant when explaining the 
probability of choice 80/20.  These variables are the product attribute, prescription drug 
  15benefits and the demographic variable net worth.  Prescription drug benefits were 
expected to be significant at the 10% level, because many politicians and others in the 
media have been concerned with this for some time.  It is possible that other attributes 
included in the model were dominant when selecting 80/20 coinsurance health insurance.   
Net worth is the other non-significant variable.  This may be attributed to the fact that 
nearly all people (not the very wealthy) find health insurance to be a necessary expense 
throughout life.  If people in all net worth ranges select similar health insurance coverage, 
this variable will return as insignificant in the model.  The product attributes deductible, 
co-payment, and premium performed as expected.  As the attribute levels for these three 
increases, the probability of choosing 80/20 will decrease.  The other attribute in the 
model was for health insurance type.  This attribute returned a positive coefficient, means 
that as health insurance type progresses from health only to health and vision, finally to 
health and dental that the probability of choice increases.  It seems reasonable that 
farmers would desire more coverage, like vision and dental over health only if the price, 
deductible, drug benefits and co-payment were the same.   
When explaining the probability of choice 90/10, the same two variables are not 
significant in the model.  These are the variables associated with prescription drug 
benefits and net worth.  Theses variable are probably non-significant for the same reasons 
as in 80/20.  All coefficients associated with health insurance 90/10 product attributes 
returned the same sign and significance as in 80/20 for the same reasons. 
The characteristics in numerator of 100/0 have one more variable that is non-
significant than the other two.  The variables that are not significant in 100/0 are 
prescription drug benefits, health insurance type, and net worth.  
  16Table 5 presents a model where demographic characteristics have been included 
with holistic insurance attributes to determine what outside factors influence holistic 
insurance choice decisions.  The holistic insurance section of the survey has been broken 
into four blocks of nine.  The independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption 
has been tested and is satisfied.  Table 5 presents the results of the discrete multinomial 
logit model: 
ε β β β β
α α α α
α α α
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The probability of choosing AGR is determined by the following significant 
variables: dependents, number of workers, healthcare spending, operators health 
insurance benefits, significant health problems, farm size, education, holistic subsidy 
switch, group, and premium.  This choice is being critically evaluated to determine if 
farmers prefer some type of whole farm insurance, and what attributes of this product are 
important to them when choosing this alternative.  When conducting focus groups 
regarding whole-farm insurance, farmers and crop insurance agents said they would be 
more likely to try whole farm insurance if and only if they were presented with higher 
coverage levels (>90%) to resemble other property insurance so it is interesting to note 
that the only holistic product attribute that was deemed insignificant in the model was the 
coverage level attribute. (This attribute was insignificant in all holistic choices)  The 
coefficient for subsidy switch is negative and significant at the 10% level for AGR.  This 
means that as subsidy switch converts premium from crop insurance to health insurance, 
the respondent will be less likely to hold AGR.  The coefficient for provider group is a 
  17negative, meaning that as the provider group switches from private to public 
(government) provider, the respondent will be less likely to hold this type of insurance.  
Premium is negative and significant as expected in this model.   
  The product attributes for revenue assurance returned the same sign and 
significance as those in AGR.  This illustrates that farmers make decisions based on the 
same product characteristics for whole farm and one crop revenue protection.  
Demographic characteristics that were significant in the selection of RA are; dependants, 
full time workers, operator health insurance benefits, spouse health insurance benefits, 
and education.  The product attributes for MPCI finds that provider group is no longer 
important to the probability of choice.  This may be because the respondent is not 
concerned with who supports that group activity, but may make decisions based on cost 
and availability. 
Conclusion  
  The results from the crop insurance section of the survey show that farmers stated 
and revealed preferences are comparable.  The crop insurance farmers hold now is what 
they choose when making stated preference decisions.  One disparity between the focus 
groups and the estimated results is that the focus groups identified that availability of 
higher coverage levels is important to them when making their crop insurance purchase 
decisions.  The estimated results showed that coverage levels for crop insurance were 
only significant at the ten percent level when selecting MPCI or yield coverage.  When 
coverage level was significant in the model, it had a positive coefficient meaning that as 
coverage level increased, so did the probability of choosing that product.  The coefficient 
for premium was usually significant at the ten percent level and had a negative 
  18coefficient, meaning that as the premiums increase, the probability of choosing that 
product will decrease.  
The results from the health insurance section of the survey illustrate that farmers 
prefer to hold any type of health insurance that is perceived affordable to them.  As 
deductible levels, office visit co-payments, and premiums increase, the probability of 
choosing that particular type of health insurance will decrease.  These results were 
expected by researchers when beginning the project.  The negative coefficient for 
prescription drug benefits was not expected.  It would seem reasonable that as drug 
benefits increased in the model, so would the probability of choosing that alternative, but 
as drug benefits increase, the probability of choosing that alternative will decrease.  The 
mean of X for prescription drug benefits was 2.69 on a one to three scale, so nearly all 
respondents chose the highest level, and other factor could be influencing this, such as 
cost.  Health insurance type has a positive coefficient in the model, meaning that as the 
health insurance type increases from health, to health and vision, and finally health vision 
and dental, the respondent will be more likely to choose that alternative. 
  Holistic insurance has proven to be more popular that expected.  64% of 
respondents chose some type of holistic insurance product.  Coverage level proved 
insignificant in all alternatives, but had a mean of X of 2.89 out of three, so most chose 
the >75% coverage level.  Subsidy switch, provider group, and premium all had negative 
coefficients meaning as these increase, the probability of that alternative choice will 
decrease.   
 
 
  19Limitations and Need for Further Research 
This study is just the beginning for those who would like to better understand 
farmers’ preferences for health, crop, and holistic insurance products.  One of the major 
limitations of this study is that subgroups have not been identified within the population.  
If a cross tab analysis were conducted to determine the insurance preferences of those in 
different counties, risk groups, or production specialties, this would provide a great 
wealth of knowledge.  If the study were broadened to include other states that may be 
lower in crop risk, there may be increased willingness for a product that includes a 
subsidy switch. 
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  21Table 1. Sample Choice Experiment Design for Health, Crop, and Holistic Products 
Choose only one of these four:         
Choice A   □  Choice B   □ Choice C   □ Choice D   □ 
Coinsurance  80/20 Coinsurance  90/10 Coinsurance  100/0       
Deductible  $500   Deductible  $750   Deductible  $500       
Drug Benefits  No Drug  Benefits  Partial Drug  Benefits No  I prefer none of 
OV Copay  $15   OV Copay  $30   OV Copay  $30   these alternatives 
Coverage Type  Health Coverage  Type  Health Coverage  Type  Health       
         Vision     Dental       
Premium  $700   Premium  $700   Premium  $550      Form 4 
 
Choose only one of these four:          
Choice A  □  Choice B  □  Choice C  □ 
Choice 
D  □ 
Type  MPCI Type  CRC Type  AGR  I prefer none of 
Coverage Level  65-75% Coverage  Level >75% Coverage  Level >75% these  alternatives 
Premium  10.0% Premium  7.5% Premium  5.0%     Form 3 
 
Choose only one of these four:          
Choice 
A  □ 
Choice 
B  □ 
Choice 
C  □ 
Choice 
D  □
Crop Type  AGR Crop  Type  RA Crop  Type  MPCI       
Coverage 
Level  >75% 
Coverage 




75%       
Subsidy 
Switch  10-20% 
Subsidy 




50%  I prefer none of 
Group  Coop Group  Gov't Group  Gov't these  alternatives 








  22Table 2: Respondent Characteristics 
Operator Age (AGE)      Health Insurance Source (HIS)   
Under 30  8%    None  3% 
31-45 44%    Individual/Self  Funded  57% 
46-60 40%    Government  1% 
Over 61  8%    Cooperatives/NGC's 3% 
Dependents (DEPEND)     Employment  Insurance  26% 
None 13%    Other  5% 
1 Dependant  20%    Operator Benefits (OHIB)   
2 Dependants  27%    No  62% 
3 Dependants  22%    Yes  38% 
4 Dependants  12%    Spouse Benefits (SHIB)   
5 Dependants  5%    No  42% 
6+ Dependants  2%    Yes  58% 
Full Time Workers (FTW)      Significant Health Problems (SHP)   
None 8%    Yes  26% 
One 41%    No  74% 
Two 40%    Education (EDU)   
Three 5%    High  School  19% 
Four +  7%    Some College  34% 
Total Assets (TA)     College  Grad  43% 
Less than $100,000  9%    Grad School  5% 
$200,000-$499,999 26%    Total Farm Size (SIZE)   
$500,000-$999,999 24%    1-500  Acres  3% 
$1,000,000-$1,999,999 26%   500-999  Acres  13% 
$2,000,000-$4,999,999 8%   1,000-1,999  Acres  30% 
Over $5,000,000  3%    2,000-2,999 Acres  24% 
Net Worth (NW)     3,000-3,999  Acres  13% 
Less than $200,000  10%    4,000 Plus Acres  13% 
$100,000-$249,999 19%    Healthcare Spending (HCS)   
$250,000-$499,999 24%    Less than $1,000  8% 
$500,000-$999,999 17%    $1,000-$1,999  10% 
$1,000,000-$2,499,999 14%   $2,000-$4,999  27% 
Over $2,500,000  6%    $5,000-$9,999  36% 
Employee Insurance (NFPEI)      $10,000+ 16% 
Yes 24%       
No 76%       
 
  23Table 3. Crop Insurance Multinomial Logit Model Results 
   Chi Squared 1101.886        
   Degrees of Freedom 27        
   McFadden R Squared 0.79098          
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Error  b/St.Er.  P[|Z|>z]  Mean of X 
Characteristics in Numerator of Prob[Y=1]    MPCI     27% 
CITYPE -13.7213  1.3919  -9.8580 0.0000  2.2810 
CICL 2.9091  0.9837  2.9570  0.0031  2.6143 
CIPREM -0.8722  0.7901  -1.1040  0.2696  2.0717 
OPYRS 0.3061  0.1838  1.6660  0.0957  25.3488 
AGE -0.2809  0.1822  -1.5420  0.1231  45.9767 
EDU 3.5873  1.0459  3.4300  0.0006  2.3372 
NW 0.6697  0.3162  2.1180  0.0342  2.9535 
NFPEI 7.8857  1.7470  4.5140  0.0000  1.9186 
SIZE 0.9001  0.2817  3.1950  0.0014  3.5814 
CLVAR -0.5752  0.5376  -1.0700  0.2847  1.7907 
Characteristics in Numerator of Prob[Y=2]    CRC     35% 
CITYPE -4.4527  1.0063  -4.4250 0.0000  2.2810 
CICL 1.1137  0.8280  1.3450  0.1786  2.6143 
CIPREM -1.6115  0.7213  -2.2340  0.0255  2.0717 
OPYRS 0.2505  0.1806  1.3870  0.1655  25.3488 
AGE -0.2232  0.1679  -1.3290  0.1837  45.9767 
EDU 2.5065  1.0045  2.4950  0.0126  2.3372 
NW 0.4824  0.2631  1.8340  0.0667  2.9535 
NFPEI 5.7208  1.6549  3.4570  0.0005  1.9186 
SIZE 0.5019  0.2150  2.3350  0.0196  3.5814 
CLVAR -0.8920  0.4169  -2.1400  0.0324  1.7907 
Characteristics in Numerator of Prob[Y=3]    AGR     17% 
CITYPE 3.5637  1.2141  2.9350  0.0033  2.2810 
CICL -0.6466  0.7103  -0.9100  0.3626  2.6143 
CIPREM -4.1297  0.9391  -4.3970  0.0000  2.0717 
OPYRS 0.2301  0.1878  1.2250  0.2205  25.3488 
AGE -0.2426  0.1743  -1.3920  0.1638  45.9767 
EDU 2.1144  1.1199  1.8880  0.0590  2.3372 
NW 0.4208  0.2848  1.4780  0.1394  2.9535 
NFPEI 2.1775  1.5663  1.3900  0.1645  1.9186 
SIZE -0.3673  0.2250  -1.6320  0.1027  3.5814 
CLVAR -0.9928  0.4860  -2.0430  0.0411  1.7907 
Percent Correct Predicted=92.8294% 
 
  24Table 4: Health Insurance Multinomial Logit Model Results 
   Chi Squared 844.2346        
   Degrees of Freedom 24        
   McFadden R Squared 0.40039        
Variable Coefficient Standard  Error  b/St.Er. P[|Z|>z]  Mean of X 
Characteristics in Numerator of Prob[Y = 1]     80/20     18% 
AGE 0.3914  0.2140  1.8290  0.0674  45.9767 
NW 0.4272  0.3284  1.3010  0.1933  2.9535 
OHIB 22.8825  9.4631  2.4180  0.0156  1.9419 
HCS 1.6267  0.7319  2.2220  0.0263  3.4186 
HIDED -5.4683  1.9600  -2.7900  0.0053  2.3592 
HIDRUG -1.0254  1.4712  -0.6970  0.4858  2.6990 
HICOPAY -4.3181  1.5979  -2.7020 0.0069  2.4380 
HITYPE 3.0853  1.3341  2.3130  0.0207  2.5879 
HIPREM -13.3330  6.7214  -1.9840  0.0473  2.1925 
Characteristics in Numerator of Prob[Y = 1]     90/10     26% 
AGE 0.3790  0.2138  1.7720  0.0763  45.9767 
NW 0.4925  0.3272  1.5050  0.1322  2.9535 
OHIB 23.3377  9.4511  2.4690  0.0135  1.9419 
HCS 1.6170  0.7318  2.2100  0.0271  3.4186 
HIDED -5.3475  1.9576  -2.7320  0.0063  2.3592 
HIDRUG -1.1108  1.4658  -0.7580  0.4486  2.6990 
HICOPAY -4.4797  1.5950  -2.8090 0.0050  2.4380 
HITYPE 2.9977  1.3427  2.2330  0.0256  2.5879 
HIPREM -13.0783  6.7196  -1.9460  0.0516  2.1925 
Characteristics in Numerator of Prob[Y = 1]     100/0     33% 
AGE 0.3775  0.2138  1.7650  0.0775  45.9767 
NW 0.4762  0.3264  1.4590  0.1445  2.9535 
OHIB 23.5688  9.4566  2.4920  0.0127  1.9419 
HCS 1.6518  0.7299  2.2630  0.0236  3.4186 
HIDED -5.4716  1.9576  -2.7950  0.0052  2.3592 
HIDRUG -1.1062  1.4639  -0.7560  0.4499  2.6990 
HICOPAY -4.4161  1.5941  -2.7700 0.0056  2.4380 
HITYPE 2.8626  1.3353  2.1440  0.0321  2.5879 
HIPREM -12.9881  6.7219  -1.9320  0.0533  2.1925 
Percent Correct Predicted=55.29% 
 
  25Table 5: Holistic Insurance Multinomial Logit Model Results 
 Chi Squared  889.0262  McFadden R
2  0.42937 
 Degrees of Freedom  42  Percent Correct Predicted=65.11 
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Error  b/St.Er.  P[|Z|>z]  Mean of X 
Characteristics in Numerator of Prob[Y = 1]     AGR     16% 
AGE -0.0077  0.0134  -0.5730 0.5664  45.9767 
DEPEND 0.1874  0.0850  2.2050 0.0275  2.2326 
FTW -0.5881  0.1891  -3.1100 0.0019  1.6279 
NW -0.0228  0.1417  -0.1610 0.8721  2.9535 
NFPEI -1.5368  0.8987  -1.7100 0.0873  1.9186 
HCS 0.1515  0.1236  1.2260 0.2203  3.4186 
OHIB 5.9576  1.2531  4.7540 0.0000  1.9419 
SHIB 0.8827  0.3860  2.2870 0.0222  1.6744 
SHP -0.8897  0.3892  -2.2860  0.0222  1.7442 
EDU 0.9606  0.1847  5.2000 0.0000  2.3372 
SIZE -0.0996  0.1541  -0.6460 0.5180  3.5814 
COCL 0.0757  0.2411  0.3140 0.7536  2.8876 
COSS -1.1323  0.2276  -4.9740 0.0000  2.6512 
COGRP -0.8742  0.2925  -2.9890  0.0028  2.6925 
COPREM -1.8341  0.3087  -5.9410 0.0000  2.4935 
Characteristics in Numerator of Prob[Y = 2]     RA     27% 
AGE -0.0078  0.0121  -0.6480 0.5168  45.9767 
DEPEND 0.2456  0.0749  3.2780 0.0010  2.2326 
FTW -0.6705  0.1658  -4.0430 0.0001  1.6279 
NW 0.0594  0.1256  0.4730 0.6361  2.9535 
NFPEI -0.7794  0.8809  -0.8850 0.3762  1.9186 
HCS 0.0814  0.1175  0.6930 0.4882  3.4186 
OHIB 4.9322  1.0576  4.6630 0.0000  1.9419 
SHIB 1.3208  0.3767  3.5060 0.0005  1.6744 
SHP -0.5097  0.3114  -1.6370  0.1016  1.7442 
EDU 0.4459  0.1308  3.4100 0.0007  2.3372 
SIZE 0.2111  0.1482  1.4240 0.1544  3.5814 
COCL -0.1034  0.2375  -0.4350 0.6633  2.8876 
COSS -1.0485  0.2091  -5.0130 0.0000  2.6512 
COGRP -0.8526  0.2884  -2.9560  0.0031  2.6925 
COPREM -1.7833  0.2990  -5.9650 0.0000  2.4935 
Characteristics in Numerator of Prob[Y = 3]     MPCI     20% 
AGE -0.0105  0.0130  -0.8120 0.4169  45.9767 
DEPEND 0.1709  0.0861  1.9860 0.0471  2.2326 
FTW -0.3198  0.1924  -1.6620 0.0965  1.6279 
NW 0.1107  0.1467  0.7550 0.4504  2.9535 
NFPEI -0.4396  0.9792  -0.4490 0.6535  1.9186 
HCS 0.1396  0.1287  1.0850 0.2778  3.4186 
OHIB 4.8458  1.2721  3.8090 0.0001  1.9419 
SHIB 0.5033  0.3900  1.2900 0.1969  1.6744 
SHP -0.5023  0.3233  -1.5530  0.1204  1.7442 
EDU 0.6359  0.1436  4.4290 0.0000  2.3372 
SIZE 0.0397  0.1693  0.2350 0.8145  3.5814 
COCL -0.1715  0.2499  -0.6860 0.4926  2.8876 
COSS -1.0125  0.2306  -4.3900 0.0000  2.6512 
COGRP -0.6069  0.3087  -1.9660  0.0493  2.6925 
COPREM -1.9623  0.3316  -5.9180 0.0000  2.4935 
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